Introductory remarks
Market relations are not confined to free competition and price-making mechanism. Market is a part of the economy as instituted process [Polanyi 1992] . It is constituted by sets of rules, regulations, and other institutional arrangements, including relations of trust. Starting with its general notion we would define trust as a belief that the other agents would act in a predictable way and fulfil their obligations without special sanctions [Coleman 1988] . Specifying this notion we differentiate between two levels through which trust relationships have to develop. The first level of trust is achieved through a predictability of behaviour of the other actors. The second level of trust is reached through mutual obligations to follow accepted conventions, which are voluntarily taken by the market actors. We also accept a division between one-sided trust in institutions and reciprocal trust among business actors [Rose-Ackerman 2001a .
Today Russia demonstrates a prominent example of a low-trust society.
Formal rules are contradictory and unstable here. There is a lack of their formal enforcement, which produces a high level of uncertainty. The state legislative and regulatory policy is non-predictable by the market actors. As a result, one-sided trust in institutions remains on the low level.
One could expect that this d eficiency of one-sided trust should be compensated by the reciprocal trust in business partners. However, what makes the situation even more demanding, reciprocal trust in business to business relationships is low as well because honesty often does not pay here. Although business actors put the highest value to honesty in relations, they do not trust each other entirely due to the frequent infringement of business contracts and non-transparency of business transactions.
Taking this into account, the central issues for investigation in the paper are the following:
• How are economic relations established when formal rules are not effectively enforced and both institutions and individuals are not trustworthy? • How does the trust emerge and develop in these relationships?
• What is a role the of state in development of one-sided trust in institutions and reciprocal trust among business partners?
To study these issues we borrow conceptual tools from two inspiring sources, including the new institutionalist theory [Eggertsson 1990; Fligstein 1996 , North 1992 ] and the literature on trust [Gambetta 1988; Hardin 2001; Rose-Ackerman 2001b; Stompka 1999] . Using these toolkits, in this paper we will treat issues of trust and distrust in Russian business relationships on the empirical level.
Data sources
Our empirical evidence is based on data collected from two projects:
• Research project "Transaction Costs in Russian Business" (1997-1998; funded by the CIPE), • Research project "The Costs of Legalisation" (2001 Legalisation" ( -2002 ; funded by Russian Business Associations RATEC and ACORT).
Project 1. Transaction Costs in Russian
Business. This project included a standardised survey and set of in-depth interviews collected with the non-state enterprise managers and entrepreneurs.
Standardised survey was conducted in November 1997 -January 1998 filled questionnaires were collected from the heads of non-state enterprises in 21 regions (mainly in the European part of Russia). All main areas of the economic activity were represented. Selected basic parameters of the surveyed enterprises and entrepreneurs are presented in the Table 1 [for detailed description of research outcomes see: Radaev 1998 Radaev , 2001a .
In-depth interviews were conducted from May 1997 to April 1998. In total 96
interviews were recorded. The main focus was made upon the emerging areas of nonstate businesses. Our sample included 27 follow-up interviews, which were conducted for the second time with the same respondents (the first survey was carried out by the Centre for Political Technologies in 1993) 1 . The data focuses on the issues of corruption, contract enforcement, use of force in business relationships, and problems of the market entry for Russian entrepreneurs.
It is important to mention that both surveys were carried out before August 1998. Therefore, the financial crisis could not seriously distort the picture. Both studies were devoted to a broad range of institutional issues. For this paper we draw the aspects of the studies devoted to formation of trust and distrust in business relations.
Creating distrust in business relations
From the standpoint of any conventional institutional theory, the observer of the market transformation in the post-communist Russia faces the following puzzle:
Puzzle Informalisation of formal rules. Conventional economic theory is largely based on the assumption of existence of the efficient legislation and relatively costless state and arbitration control, which provide enforcement of formal rules [Williamson 1985 ]. This assumption displays its obvious weakness in case of Russia, in which public institutions are not able to impose effective sanctions against opportunism and malfeasance.
A principal reason is that institutional arrangements in Russian business are strongly influenced by a developed mechanism of the informalization of rules. The latter is considered here as a continuous transformation of institutions, in which formal rules are largely substituted by the informal arrangements and built into informal relationships. We described the main elements of the informalisation of rules elsewhere [Radaev 2001c ]. Here we recall them very briefly.
First, formal rules are imposed by the public officials in a way, which leaves room for their discretion and creates a high level of uncertainty for the market actors.
Second, confronting high costs of compliance with the formal rules, economic agents create specific governance structures to avoid formal rules on a systematic basis.
Third, public officials establish selective control, in which forma l rules are used for extortion and selective pressures on economic agents.
Fourth, economic agents, in turn, bargain with the public officials on terms and conditions of the formal rules implementation.
Fifth, multiple arguments and interpretations are p roduced to legitimate practices of informalisation.
Russian entrepreneurs have proved to be very innovative in inventing informal business schemes to cope with the discrepancies in formal rules without direct confrontation with the state authorities. Normally, it takes less than one week to adjust to a newly adopted formal rule. The best corporate and free-lance lawyers and accountants are engaged in elaboration of the business schemes with various degrees of legality. As a result, Russian business is large ly non-transparent. Our study of the area of imported electronic goods demonstrate that the largest share of these goods has been brought into the country by using grey (semi-legal) schemes, which does not strictly follow the law. Involvement into the shadow activity leads to nontransparency of Russian business, which prevents formation of the trust relationships.
Here is a conclusion of our respondent: Thus, a major part of entrepreneurs prefer informal ways of dispute settlement.
There are several reasons for that. First, the Arbitration court has proved to be one of the most corrupt institutions, which are widely used for asset stripping and aggressive mergers. Second, these Courts are not independent from the direct influences of the government officials and business corporations. Moreover, they are frequently used as instrument of unfair competition to push out the rivals. So, the courts are not trusted in Russia at present. Third, arbitration procedures are time-consuming and costly. It may cost from 1.5 to 5 % of the disputed sum (which may be specially difficult for the small firms). Fourth, there is no guarantee that justice will be established due to many gaps in existing legislation. Fifth, even in case of success in the court, it does not necessarily mean that the losses will be covered. Thus, apart from inefficiency of the state authorities and high transaction costs there exist implicit conventions, which pursue the entrepreneurs to resolve delicate issues among themselves without attracting a third party. This logic of negative solidarity dividing «us» (businessmen) and «them» (authorities) is still influential.
And formal appeals to the state are judged frequently on moral grounds as attempts to break somebody down. This is a specific case illustrating how reliance on public institutions could undermine interpersonal trust instead of giving it more strength.
Lack of reciprocal trust. When one-sided trust in institutions is low we could expect that it should be compensated by higher reciprocal trust in kin, friends, and business contractors. Our evidence demonstrates that business to business relationships are not subject to such an simple causation.
There is a widespread distrust displayed in business relations. First of all, it is reflected in the attitude to the newcomers and outsiders. However, even in case of long-term relations with regular partners it presents a serious problem. do not see a problem here at all. Let us mention that these results were also supported by our previous research findings in the 1996 nation-wide sur vey of entrepreneurs [Radaev 1996, p. 74-76] .
As for the personal experience of entrepreneurs, it strongly correlates with their general attitudes. A vast majority of entrepreneurs (82 %) reported that they confronted with that sort of opportunistic behaviour in their own day-to-day business activity. One third of them (32 %) faced it on a frequent basis. There has been a continuous debate among Russian experts whether the chronic inter-enterprise payment arrears result from the macroeconomic i nstability and rigid monetarist policies of the Russian Government or they are largely an outcome of conscious opportunistic strategies of the enterprise managers "seeking their self-interest with guile" (O.Williamson). In our opinion, both factors might contribute to distortions in the payment systems. In any case, it produces serious institutional effects creating distrust among business partners.
Request for honesty. One could ask if the level of trust is identified as an important problem at all. Our d ata gives a positive answer here. In our 1998 standardised survey we put an open-ended question to the Russian entrepreneurs to reveal what the most important personal qualities are, which are highly valued when looking for the business partners. Almost fo rty characteristics were pointed out in total. Having been clustered, they help to display the most demanding issue required from the business partners. It turns out that nearly everyone points into the same direction saying that business partners must be honest and trustworthy. As we are informed by the economic and sociological theory, it is intuition and intellect, creativity and motivation that are normally imputed to «the real entrepreneur» [Radaev 1997, chapter 6] . However, these personal qualities were not frequently mentioned. Honesty and trustworthiness were absolute winners over all other issues. Table 4 .
So, Russian entrepreneurs are quite conscious about honesty. And we would argue that their concern is neither about high moral values nor about generalised trust.
When laying claims for honesty the entrepreneurs care about very practical rules of business conduct, like payments on time and reliability in payments in general.
Creating trust in business relations
Let us turn to the main question of our study now. «Everyone is now more cautious than before» (1998, head of construction firm).
Contractual forms of protection. Given Russian entrepreneurs had to exercise control over transactions at their own risk, they take some precautionary measures. They start with introducing discriminatory elements into the business contracts. The requirement of pre-payments could serve the most prominent example
here. In case of transactions with the new partners, pre-payments were considered as a compulsory instrument. As it is noted by an entrepreneurs:
«Partial pre-payment is the only real guarantee» (1998, head of trading and produc tion firm).
One more precautionary measure is to start business deals with some small probing contracts or/and divide the transfers into several stages to ensure the outcomes. If the probing contracts prove to work successfully, business partners increase the volume of the delivered goods and services step by step. At the beginning of 1990s Russian entrepreneurs took full risks of malfeasance given the lack of reliable and systematic sources of business information.
By the end of 1990s opportunities for getting data on financial sustainability and business reputation of the market actors are considerably improved. The data on potential business partners is collected both from public and commercial registers and databases. Foreign partners are checked up through the embassies and trading offices of the large firms in the foreign count ries. 
Stigmatisation of defectors . Having established conventions, the market
actors also elaborate special instruments of demarcation among those who deserve trust and those who are stigmatised as non-trustworthy. Our respondents make an important distinction between three prevalent models of action, namely:
• Acting by laws
• Acting by rules
• Acting by no rules
Acting by laws presumes following the official formal rules (for example, paying the full amount of taxes and duties to the state). In fact, most entrepreneurs are not able to hold this line consistently with regard to all legal norms in Russia. Large transnational companies having big financial capacities and strict corporate codes can be an exception to this.
A major part of Russian market sellers follow a different line, which is defined as acting by rules. These rules (pravila) differ from laws though they are always 
The state as a source of trust and distrust
Any conventions among the market actors could be easily undermined if they are not backed by a stable state policy. Relations of the market actors with the state officials present a complex mixture of trust and distrust, in which distrust is dominant.
It is reflected to some extent in the following puzzle:
Puzzle 3. Market actors do not trust the state authorities. But even more they do not trust institutions, which are not backed by the state.
We will develop our argument based on the following propositions.
Proposition 8 Formally speaking, one can treat it as a clear manifestation of irrational behaviour because the firms collecting money were privately owned and the state was not supposed to take responsibility for their actions. However, it was the state that was blamed for the losses in the end.
The second example comes from the history of the 1998 financial crisis, after which a part of private savings got lost in the bankrupt commercial banks. Although the crisis was caused by the state default, after the crush there was a massive inflow of private savings to the Sberbank, which was the largest state-run bank. Thus, money came back to the state, which was a fundamental reason for the 'market failure'.
Both phenomena could be explained with the help of the concept of moral economy [Polanyi 1992 ], according to which the state as the most powerful actor must It is not the one-sided trust only but also the reciprocal trust, which strongly depends on the state activity. The point is that reciprocal trust is largely built upon predictability of actions of other market actors. Predictability makes the first step towards trust in relations, in which distrust still prevails. As far as the state is the main provider of formal and informal rules, no profound reciprocal trust could be established among business actors without a predictability of the state policies. Any business to business conventions would be seriously undermined is case of spontaneous changes in regulatory framework. Therefore, all these conventions are built upon certain expectations of the state actions. relationships. However, the lack of reciprocal trust among company leaders and public officials still presents one of the major constraints limiting capacities of building both one-sided trust in institutions and reciprocal trust among businesses.
To conclude, a general logic of the trust formation in the distrustful environment can be described as follows. It starts on a micro level with the informal private ordering and closed business networks. They serve as instruments for creating elements of the interpersonal trust. The character of these reciprocal relations is also changing over time. Starting previously with the affect-based trust, the market actors move towards the reputation-based trust. Investment in reputation contributes to the development of one-sided trust in public institutions, like business associations. In turn, these associations become vehicles for establishing trust in the state authorities.
Finally, predictability of the state policy encourage both one-sided and reciprocal trust.
Conclusion
New Russian markets present a prominent example of the low-trust environment. Formal rules are contradictory and changeable here. They become subject to intensive informalisation. The state policy is often non-transparent and nonpredictable, and therefore, become a major source of institutional instability. This situation produces uncertainty and undermines one-sided trust in formal institutions.
Reciprocal trust in the other market actors is also seriously undermined for Summing it up, trust formation in the low-trust society starts at the micro level of interpersonal relations in different market segments. Then it develops from the mutual trust in members of the business networks to the one-sided trust in institutions dealing with these networks. As a precondition of it, the state with a predictable policy must stand behind the market institutions. In turn, it stimulate further development of reciprocal trust and create conditions for the continuous trust selfenforcement. 
Political and governmental institutions Index (%)
President Administration +3.6
Regional Administration -8.4
Local Administration -10.7
Russian Federation Government -6.7
Council of Federation -11.9
State Parliament -29.4
Regional parliament -15.5
Source: www.fom.ru/reports/frames/short/d011703.html 
